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Abstract 
Hospitals and physicians have been working together for years in providing specialized 
health services. However, Hospital-Physician Relationships are considered lukewarm at best. 
We build on psychological contract theory to develop an in-depth understanding of how 
physicians (N=15) and hospital executives (N=15) in Belgium experience and interpret 
obligations in their working relationship. Our analysis yielded a rich understanding of mutual 
obligations and areas of ambiguity. Two major themes emerged from the analysis. A 
distinction should be made between administrative obligations (adequate support and 
responsive decision making) and professional obligations (clinical excellence and physician 
autonomy). Two areas of ambiguity could be identified reflecting both dimensions. An 
economic trade-off exists in the day-to-day interaction and therefore views on how the way 
care should be organized differ. In addition, the extent to which medical decisions should 
take into account the corresponding impact on hospital finance varies.  
 






Hospitals and physicians have been working together for years in providing specialized 
health services. In general, physicians provide the medical care while the hospitals provide 
the resources by which the care can be managed and delivered (Schramko, 2007). In this 
working relationship the physician acts as a professional, independent decision maker who 
has considerable control over the resources of the hospital. Their relationship was 
historically labelled as a ‘workshop model’ in which both parties worked relatively 
independent of each other, maximizing the professional autonomy of the physician (Pauly & 
Redisch, 1973; Harris, Hicks & Kelly, 1992). However, hospital financing has evolved from a 
retrospective, cost-based reimbursement to a prospective financing system (Jegers, 
Kesteloot, De Graeve, & Gilles, 2002). This has led to unaligned incentives: hospitals are 
stimulated to provide cost-effective care but also have to persuade and educate physicians 
whose fee-for-service incentives remain for the most part the same (Burns & Muller, 2008). 
As a result, these conflicting financial incentives between physicians and hospitals are often 
cited as a major obstacle to effective collaboration (Mark, Evans, Schur, & Guterman, 1998; 
Goldsmith, 2007) and a set of long-standing practices characterized by medicine’s 
dominance and physician autonomy are challenged (Castellani & Wear, 2000). Consequently 
it has been argued that Hospital-Physician Relationships (HPRs) moved from a symbiotic 
relationship to competitive interdependence (Burns, Anderson, & Shortell, 1990; Berenson, 
Ginsburg, & May, 2007). In this challenging environment hospital executives have been 
struggling to build effective hospital-physician relationships (Smith, Reid, & Piland, 1990; von 
Knorring, de Rijk, & Alexanderson, 2010) which have been pointed out as a critical 
determinant of organizational succes (Kaissi, 2005).  
The process of building effective relationships with the medical staff has been described as 
physician-hospital integration. Three approaches to achieve greater integration can be 
distinguished (Burns & Muller, 2008). The first approach is rooted in economic literature in 
which alignment is realized by financial means (economic integration). The second 
represents a sociological perspective, emphasizing the cooperative nature of the relationship 
(noneconomic integration). The third concentrates on the clinical dimension, the 
coordination of patient care (clinical integration). Since it can be argued that noneconomic 
integration lies at the very basis of physician alignment, building the needed trust and laying 
the foundation for alignment of financial incentives (Trybou, Gemmel, & Annemans, 2011) 
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and integrated care delivery (Gillies, Shortell, Anderson, Mitchell, & Morgan, 1993), we focus 
on the non-economic approach. This is considered to be a means to realize increased 
cooperation and refers to hospitals’ efforts to make their facilities more attractive and 
accessible, their operations more efficient and convenient, their decision-making processes 
more participative and responsive and their staffing better trained (Burns & Muller, 2008). 
Moreover, these efforts emphasize the needed cooperative behaviour in the symbiotic 
relationship with the hospital and recognize physicians’ professional career needs to build, 
maintain and expand their practices (Shortell et al., 2001). It aims at making the hospital 
more attractive for physicians by improving the hospital’s working environment and 
addressing physicians’ related concerns (Berenson, Bodenheimer, & Pham, 2006). 
Our analysis of the transcribed interviews builds on psychological contract theory and yields 
a rich understanding of how physicians and hospital executives interpret and experience 
mutual obligations and areas of ambiguity. There has been a plethora of research on 
psychological contracts in the last 20 years inside and outside the healthcare sector. This 
research has led to a large body of empirical research that demonstrated the explanatory 
power of the psychological contract to a variety of work-related attitudinal and behavioural 
outcomes (Conway & Briner, 2005). The psychological contract consists of the individual’s 
belief regarding terms and conditions of the exchange agreement between the individual 
and his or her organization. It refers to the way the working relationship is interpreted, 
understood and enacted by individuals at the interface between themselves and their 
organization. Key issues include the belief that explicit and implicit promises have been 
made and a consideration offered in exchange for it, binding the parties to some set of 
reciprocal obligations (Rousseau, 1989). It has been shown repeatedly and consistently that 
individuals seek to enter and maintain a fair and balanced exchange relationship with the 
organization they work at, described as the norm of reciprocity (Cropanzo & Mitchell, 2005). 
This norm is based on the belief that organizational members tend to reciprocate beneficial 
treatment they receive with positive work-related behaviour and tend to reciprocate 
detrimental treatment they receive with negative work-related behaviour (Blau, 1964; 
Gouldner, 1960). In this respect, the management of the psychological contract may have 
important implications on hospitals’ ability to motivate and align highly skilled physicians. 
We use the concept of the psychological contract as our dominant theoretical framework to 
examine the hospital-physician relationship.  The aim of this study is to understand how 
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physicians and hospital managers experience mutual obligations and areas of ambiguity 
within their working relationship. 
 
Methods 
We developed a robust understanding of the lived experience of the psychological contract 
between physicians and the hospital they practice at through the qualitative analysis of data 
obtained from transcribed interviews. Using a qualitative approach, our analysis focuses on 
the understanding of how physicians and hospital executives interpret and experience 
mutual obligations and areas of ambiguity in their psychological contract. Previous research 
has generally focused on capturing the organizations’ obligations to the individual, thereby 
neglecting the measurement of the individuals’ obligations and failing to study adequately 
the content and mutual character of psychological contracts. Following Winter and Jackson 
(2006), to capture both the hospital and physician perspectives of the psychological contract, 
managers were treated as agents of the organization and are in a position to convey 
promises or future commitments to physicians as actions of the organization itself (Kotter, 
1973). This approach is consistent with Rousseau’s (1995) viewpoint that organizations 
become party to psychological contracts as principals who directly express their own terms 
or through agents who represent them.  
 
Data collection 
This study builds further on the data collected in chapter 4. In addition, interviews were 
performed at a third Belgian hospital. In accordance to qualitative research methodology, 
the hospital choice was based on the principle of variation. Specifically, the selected 
hospitals varied in size (350 – 850 beds) and ownership type (public or private). Because our 
research focuses on self-employed physicians, all hospitals were not-for-profit hospitals with 
an independent, self-employed medical staff. We conducted interviews with both physicians 
and members of the executive committee. Within the executive committee the Chief 
Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Medical director and Chief Nursing Officer were 
chosen because of the difference in responsibilities within the hospitals and the difference in 
their day-to-day interaction with the medical staff. In addition, because of the central role of 
the medical board in the structured negotiation between the medical staff and the hospital 
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board, the president of the medical board was also interviewed. The different specialties 
were chosen based on differences in operational linkages with the hospital (i.e. the use of 
the operating theatre and supporting personnel) and differences in their remuneration and 
associated incentives (medical fees). Within each hospital we conducted an interview with a 
paediatrician, geriatrician, cardiologist, orthopaedist and a general surgeon. All interviews 
were performed by the first author lasting between 30 and 60 minutes. The 30 interviews 
satisfied the number necessary to reach data saturation for this study.  
 
Data analysis 
Following the studies of von Knorring and colleagues (2010) and Jones and Sambrook (2010) 
the data analysis was based on the constant comparison method (Holloway & Wheeler, 
2009). An initial set of categories for coding the data based on the described definition of 
noneconomic physician-hospital integration (Burns & Muller, 2008) was used. Interview 
questions were of an open-ended, semi-structured nature designed to allow participants to 
address issues which they believed to be most significant. The final question provided an 
opportunity to compare the perceived obligations between executives and physicians. 
During the interviews probing questions were used to ensure the participant’s experiences 
were grounded in concrete situations to increase the validity of the interview.  
All interviews were transcribed in full and analysis began whilst the data were still being 
collected. This provided the possibility to explore in further detail each theme that emerged 
in later interviews. The transcripts were read repeatedly, initial open data exploration was 
followed by identification of concepts and their relationships. Interview transcripts were 
scrutinized by the first author and categories were applied to the data. Thereafter, the 
content of the statements (meaning units) was condensed and changes to the categories 
were made according to what the data revealed (Miles, 1979).  Table 1 provides an example 
of the coding procedure. The issues were explored thematically. The findings that are the 
subject of this paper relate to the interconnected themes listed in table 2. Finally, the results 
were read by all co-authors to discuss the reproduction and interpretation of the analysis.  
In the results section, identified codes and themes of the statements are illustrated by direct 
quotations from the interviews. All quotes presented here were translated from Dutch. The 
quotes can be related to a specific type of interviewee by identification letters: (MD) if the 
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We asked study participants about their beliefs about the hospital-physician relationship and 
their perceptions of the obligations that exist within this relationship. Although physicians 
operate as independent practitioners with a distinctive revenue stream, they need 
organizational support that enables them to practice medicine. This confirms the suggestion 
that in the case of the psychological contract of physicians, It has been suggested that the 
perceived obligations are shaped by professional and administrative work ideologies 
(Bunderson, 2001).. Both ideologies are relevant in understanding how physicians relate to 
the hospital they practice at. In other words, physicians interact with the hospital both as 
professional and as organizational member. As professional, they assume and ascribe 
particular roles (a set of perceived rights and obligations)  to the organization that are 
consistent with the institution and ideology of professional work. As organizational 
members, they assume and ascribe particular roles to the organization that are consistent 
with the institution and ideology of the administrative organization. Table 2 summarizes 
some of the key differences between professional and administrative work ideologies. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Our qualitative findings demonstrate that  hospitals’ obligations typically consist of issues 
related to organizing and planning the hospital care. Different obligations related to 
supporting physicians in building and maintaining their practice can be identified. A 
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distinction can be drawn between administrative obligations (adequate support and 
responsive decision making processes) and professional obligations (clinical excellence and 
physician autonomous medical decision making). In addition, within these main themes 
several sub-themes emerged. These findings are discussed in the following paragraphs. The 





Insert table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Beliefs about effective hospital-physician relationships 
The interviews started with a direct question that inquired about beliefs of what an optimal, 
effective hospital-physician relationship consists of. In addition to their responses to this 
question, respondents mentioned the characteristics of “a good relationship (MD 4 & CO 
12)” also in response to other questions during the interview. The vast majority of the 
respondents reported that “an open, constructive relationship (CO 8)” and “mutual respect, 
communication and trust (MD 12)” are foundation building features that are indispensable 
to realize effective relationships and ultimately crucial to improve hospital performance. 
Related to this, one physician reported “understanding the viewpoint of physicians (MD 8)” 
and another participant stressed the importance of “taking into account the interests of the 
other party (CO 3)” as prerequisites to constructive cooperation. The belief that interests of 
the hospital and the medical staff are not fully aligned is illustrated by these comments. 
 
Adequate support 
This theme describes the interviewees’ experiences of obligations related to providing 
adequate support to physicians. Physicians rely on hospital resources to deliver medical 
care. The way supporting processes are organized has an influence on their day-to-day 
activities. Related to this obligation, three subthemes emerged from the interviews. 
Participants stressed the importance of an adequate number and competent supportive 
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staff, talented and skilled physicians-colleagues and efficient and convenient operations that 
enhance physicians’ efficiency. 
 
An adequate number and competent supportive staff. Hospitals deliver integrated 
secondary care. Whereas the care is coordinated by physicians, a lot of supporting staff with 
specific expertise and experience is invoked. Nurses are responsible for the bedside nursing 
care (i.e. wound care and the administration of drugs), technicians assist them in performing 
medical procedures (i.e. imaging, interventional and surgical procedures) and other 
professionals like physiotherapists and pharmacists provide other specific care. As one 
respondent reported: 
 An adequate number of nurses to monitor my patients is a basic requirement to 
realize high quality care. This is equally important at night. Next to the staffing level, 
their competence is of the upmost importance (MD 5). 
 
 However, physicians are ultimately responsible for the quality and coordination of the 
delivered care. A physician clarified this aspect as follows:  
It is a well-known fact that a lot of errors are made for instance with the 
administration of drugs. As a physician, I’m legally responsible for the care to my 
patient. However, I can’t monitor the patient care 24 hours a day. To realize high-
quality care I need competent supporting staff that can be relied on (MD 12).  
 
Providing adequate as well as competent supportive staff can therefore be considered as an 
important obligation of the hospital and a key concern of physicians. This was confirmed by 
the hospital executives as a key obligation of the hospital.  
 
Talented and skilled physicians-colleagues. The medical field is characterized by 
specialization and interdisciplinary dialogue between different specialties is increasingly 
important. Attracting competent physicians that contribute to the realization of high quality 
care is an important obligation of the hospital. Besides providing adequate supporting staff, 
it is also important for physicians that the hospital attracts and retains competent physician-




Practicing medicine is increasingly complex and patient care has evolved from a 
mono- to multidisciplinary model ... given the shortage of certain specialties, 
cooperation with other, competent specialists is a major concern (MD 2). 
 
 An important referral pattern within the hospital exists, this generates additional 
patient care for colleagues with other (sub)specialties (MD 7).  
 
Hospital executives did acknowledge this obligation in the hospital-physician relationship 
and indicated this as “a shared responsibility (CO 3 and CO 12)”. Moreover, the medical 
board and groups of physicians (the associations) play a dominant role in attracting 
physicians. This finding illustrates that felt obligations by physicians are not solely shaped by 
the hospital but are also cocreated by the medical staff (hospital management with 
physicians). 
 
Efficient and convenient operations. A majority of the respondents believe that 
assuring efficient and convenient operations to physicians is one of the primary obligations 
of the hospital. As one physician commented: 
 
The way the care is organized has a direct impact on my personal efficiency. When I 
need to wait for results or needed support, I’m losing valuable time, time that can 
be spent to patient care (MD 9).  
 
Related to this, respondents stressed the financial importance of well-organized operations 
from a physician perspective. As an independent practitioner with a distinctive revenue 
stream they are responsible for generating their own income. Efficient operations limit the 
opportunity cost of time spent away from their own practice and maximize the time 
available for remunerated patient care. A physician clarified that “considering the fee-for-
service payment system of medical fees, the way the care is organized has also important 
financial implications (MD 1)”.  
Hospital Executives acknowledge that efficiency and convenient operations are important to 
physicians since “the physicians act as independent caregivers generating their own income 
[professional fees] (CO 6)”. However, executives accentuate this aspect as import area of 
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ambiguity since in the “day-to-day interaction between both parties an economic trade-off 
exists (CO 11)”. The way the care is organized may be very efficient for the physician but 
from a hospital perspective it can be inefficient and even wasteful. An executive pinpointed:  
 
Modern hospital care is characterized by multidisciplinary. Physicians appeal to a lot 
of supporting staff (i.e. nurses). Whereas it can be considered efficient to delegate 
certain tasks to a nurse from a physician practice perspective, from a hospital 
perspective this might be inefficient and increase labour costs. Similarly, when 
nurses regularly have to wait for a delayed physician (i.e. to begin the medical 
round at the nursing ward) hospital costs increase (CO 1).  
 
Participative and responsive decision making 
Physician involvement in hospital decision-making processes could be identified as a central 
theme in the interviews. Physicians frequently stressed the importance of decisions made by 
executives to their own day-to-day practice. They need hospital resources, managed by 
hospital executives, to deliver medical care. Accordingly physicians expect participative and 
responsive decision-making processes. Specifically, resource allocation and budgeting 
decisions were perceived as indispensable to develop their medical practice and clinical field 
further. Likewise, respondents believe that participative and responsive decision making 
processes are crucial to the individual medical staff members:  
 
The core business of the hospital is to deliver medical care. Therefore, besides the 
patients, physicians are the most important stakeholders of the hospital. The 
medical field is complex and is highly specialized, consequently clinically related 
choices can only be made in close cooperation with the medical staff (MD 9). 
 
Justice and equal treatment of physician(group)s were expressed as a central concern by the 
interviewed physicians. The participants asserted that fairness of the procedures used in 
hospital decision making is an important aspect. Additionally, the explanation provided to 
physicians, which conveys information about why procedures were used in a certain way or 
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why decision outcomes were distributed in a certain fashion, is considered an obligation of 
hospital management. This was acknowledged by the interviewed executives:  
 
We inform our physicians about the important management decisions made in the 
hospital . . . since they are our professional partners in delivering care they have the 
right to have information when significant decisions are made . . . this also raises 
their level of commitment to the hospital (CO 8).  
 
While different committees that defend the interests of the medical staff as a whole are 
present in the hospital, participative and responsive decision making processes are also 
important at the level of individual medical staff members: A physician clarified: 
 
 The composition of these committees is often determined by elections. At first 
sight, this seems fair but it is important to realize that the medical staff is not a 
homogenous group and is composed of different groups of specialties with different 
needs. Consequently, the specialties that are greater in number are elected and the 
smaller specialties like paediatrics are strongly underrepresented (MD 11).  
 
Professional obligations 
Clinical excellence. At first sight hospital and the medical staff members have clearly 
the same objective: the improvement of the health of individuals by providing excellent 
hospital care. Since the medical professional plays a central role in realizing high quality care, 
it is not surprising that the interviewees perceive “excellent medical care (CO 3)” and 
“meeting the high standards of clinical practice (MD 6)” as the primary obligations of the 
medical staff members. Respondents clarified that the “essence of the working relationship 
lies in the clinical contribution of the MD (CO 9)” and stressed that “the medical expertise, 
competence and skills of physicians are of the upmost importance (MD 3)”. Therefore, the 
clinical contribution of physicians to the secondary care delivered in the hospital lies at the 
heart of the hospital-physician relationship and is considered to be the primary professional 




Physician autonomous medical decision making. Physicians enjoy a monopoly in 
several major decision areas (i.e. admit and discharge patients, the decision to perform a 
certain procedure). In the past, this professional autonomy was reinforced by the financing 
system by which physicians were paid on a fee-for-service basis and hospitals were paid on 
the basis of costs incurred. As such, the financial incentives were aligned. However, the 
financial relationship between hospitals and physicians has changed. Hospitals have evolved 
from a physician workshop to accountable organizations, charged with the development of 
internal organizations where quality and cost effectiveness go hand in hand. Hospitals bear 
the associated financial risk of DRG-payment systems (and sometimes pay for quality 
initiatives) creating a greater need for managing the delivery of care. Consequently physician 
autonomy has eroded in recent years. In the interviews, the safeguarding of physician 
autonomy was expressed as a central concern and primary obligation of hospital 
management by a vast majority of the interviewed physicians. Two respondents 
commented:  
 
Medical decision making, for instance the choice of an implant, is purely a medical 
matter. Hospital management has no business with those decisions and I must be 
able to make this choice independently. Physician autonomy has to be respected 
(MD 5).  
 
As physicians we can interact and cooperate with for instance the development of 
clinical pathways and efficient admission and discharge policies, however we have 
to draw the line between interactive delivery and purely medical decisions made 
between patient and physician (MD 15). 
 
However executives stressed the different financial incentives induced by the payment 
framework characterized by a dual split in payment (in which physicians and hospital have 
separate revenue streams). During the interviews it became clear that hospitals, confronted 
with a prospective payment system, have to persuade physicians to adjust their medical 
behaviour while their fee-for-service incentives remain largely the same. Prospective 
payment systems create “a greater need for managing the delivery of care (CO 5)”. This 
introduces considerable financial risk on an organizational level and potential conflict of 
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interest into the triangular relationship hospital-physician-patient. There is clearly a tension 
between the need for independent medical decision making, focusing on the individual 
patient interest and the adversarial payment system of hospitals that concentrates on an 
aggregated level (i.e. the mean length of stay). In response to these financial incentives 
installed by the payment system, hospital management responds by the use of a variety of 
techniques intended to reduce the cost of secondary care (i.e. length of stay) and improve 
the quality of care (i.e. clinical pharmacy). Guidelines, formularies, profiling and financial 
agreements are used and force physicians to consider not only the needs of the individual 
patient but also those of the hospital. While the improvement of the health of his or her 
individual patients is still the primary responsibility of the physician, this is no longer his or 
her exclusive responsibility. Modern health care delivery forces physicians to consider not 
only the needs of the patient but also those of the hospital:  
 
Of course our physicians need to take into account the financial impact their 
medical decisions have on the hospital. Modern care delivery is characterized by 
budgetary constraints and hospitals are held accountable for the assigned public 
means. Pharmaceutical prescriptions, length of stay and performed technical 
examinations have an important influence on the hospital bottom line [hospital 
financial performance]. This economic reality should be taken into account by 
physicians to realize cost-effective, sustainable hospital care (CO 2). 
 
Discussion  
Internationally, physician-hospital integration has emerged in response to increased 
pressures to improve quality and cost-effectiveness of hospital care delivery. However, while 
previous research has focused almost exclusively on the contractual arrangements between 
both hospital and physician we have shown that physician-hospital integration encompasses 
more than just strengthening the economic ties between both. Using the theoretical lens of 
psychological contract theory, our findings draw attention to the importance of 
noneconomic integration. Moreover, the majority of the participants in our study stressed 
the importance of an open, constructive relationship characterized by respect, 
communication and mutual understanding. Trust emerged as a foundation-building 
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characteristic of the hospital physician relationship. This finding is supported by the large 
body of evidence that consistently found trust as an outcome of cooperative behavior (Zhao, 
Wayne, Glibkowski, & Bravo, 2007) and a key element of effective work relationships 
between hospital managers and physicians (Succi, Lee, & Alexander, 1998).  
The results of our study have some important implications. Firstly, it is clear that the policy-
framework has a great influence on the working relationship between executives and 
physicians. More specifically, the dual split in payment and the alignment of incentives poses 
serious challenges to the hospital-physician relationship (Goldsmith, 2007; Berenson et al., 
2007). This conflict of interest challenges physician autonomy and tends to fuel conflicts. 
Therefore, it is perceived as an obstacle to effective collaboration between hospital and the 
medical staff and a more integrated policy view on hospital financing is highly needed.  
Secondly, hospital executives should recognize the critical need to develop and maintain 
effective hospital-physician relationships in order to realize cost-effective care delivery. 
Research rooted in social exchange has shown that individuals seek to enter and maintain a 
fair and balanced exchange relationship with the organization they work at (Cropanzo & 
Mitchell, 2005). This principle is based on the belief that physicians tend to reciprocate 
beneficial (or detrimental) treatment they receive with positive (or negative) work-related 
attitudes and behaviour (Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960). In this respect, the management of 
hospital-physician relationships can be considered to be highly important. Our interviews 
have shown that participative and responsive decision making is a key concern of physicians. 
These findings are consistent with the large body of evidence focusing on organizational 
justice (Colquit, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). Moreover, it has been shown that 
responsive and participatory decision making processes enhance trusting relationships with 
executives and enables effective work relationships (Succi et al., 1998). Furthermore, taking 
into consideration and weighing the interests (of the hospital vs. self-employed physician) 
was described as a difficult balancing act that characterizes the physician-hospital working 
relationship. Involving physicians in hospital decision making can increase their fiduciary 
responsibility and exposure to tough decisions, both of which are likely to increase physician 
sensitivity to hospital performance (Smith et al., 1990). In addition, our findings raise a 
number of important questions for future research. One important avenue for future 
research is to focus on the importance of social exchange and reciprocity in the hospital-
physician relationship. Moreover, physician response to perceptions that the hospital is not 
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fulfilling its obligations (psychological contract breach) would be insightful. Specifically, the 
sensitivity to unmet professional obligations compared to unmet administrative obligations 
can be considered interesting (Buderson, Lofstrom, & Van De Ven, 2000; Burderson, 2001). 
Furthermore, given recent efforts to reform the financing and delivery of health care, the 
degree to which the perceived medical autonomy by physicians is preserved can be valuable 
information (Spyridonidis & Calnan, 2011). Our research demonstrates the usefulness of the 
concepts of reciprocity and the psychological contract in understanding and improving 
hospital-physician relationships. This analysis should assist hospital executives and 
physicians in building cooperative relationships needed to improve the quality and cost-
effectiveness of hospital care delivery. We hope that this study and any further work which 
arises from it will inform and challenge current debate. 
 
Conclusion  
Our analysis of the transcribed interviews yielded a rich understanding of how physicians 
and hospital executives interpret and experience mutual obligations and areas of ambiguity 
in their psychological contract. We found that a distinction should be made between 
administrative obligations (adequate support and responsive decision making) and 
professional obligations (clinical excellence and physician autonomy). Executives should 
recognize the critical need to develop and maintain effective hospital-physician relationships 
in order to realize cost-effective care delivery.  The policy framework in which hospitals and 
physicians operate has a great influence on the working relationship between physicians and 
executives. The dual split in payment and alignment of incentives is frequently perceived as 
an obstacle to effective collaboration. Two areas of ambiguity could be identified reflecting 
both dimensions. On the one hand a trade-off exists in the day-to-day interaction of self-
employed physicians with the hospital. Therefore, the interpretation of executives and 
medical staff members about the way the care should be organized differs. On the other 
hand, in contrast to the prospective hospital financing system, physicians are mainly 
remunerated by fee-for-service. The extent to which physicians should take into account the 
impact their medical decisions have on the hospitals’ financial performance varies between 
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